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This paper considers the effects of trade unions on the education sector in 
Argentina. We have provided a substantial amount of new information and we 
have found useful preliminary results on some of the channels of union influence 
on the performance of this crucial sector. We find that those provinces where 
teacher unionism is fragmented, where union density is higher and where political 
relations with the governor are more conflictual, have more strikes (fewer class 
days). Based on estimates of education production functions both in this paper 
and elsewhere, we expect this to translate into lower student performance. We 
then find a number of weak conclusions related to the impact that unions have on 
several variables that affect students’ performance (i.e., teachers’ tenure, job 
satisfaction, class size, education budget and teachers’ salaries). Reviewing these 
results, we conclude that the impact of unions on students’ performance depends 
on the channel and kind of political market where unions operate, but not on the 
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  3  4Introduction 
 
Education is one of the main instruments for fostering human capabilities and overall freedoms 
so that individuals can lead the kind of lives they have reason to value. Education is also 
essential in building democratic values, improving human development and contributing to 
economic growth (Sen, 1999). Therefore, when an educational system is not performing well, the 
consequences are dire.  
Several studies have pointed out that education remains a factor in reinforcing inequities 
rather than in reducing them due to the deficits of the Argentine educational system (IADB, 
1996; Fiszbein, 1999). Low-income people do not have access to high quality education, and 
they generally fail to complete secondary education. Furthermore, achievement is poor compared 
to other countries that invest similar amounts in education. Hence, although Argentina’s net 
enrollment ratios for primary and lower secondary education are high, there is a perception of 
poor quality. 
There is a consensus in Latin America that good teaching is key to school improvement. 
As a result, attention to teachers’ incentives and their impact on teaching performance has been 
growing in the region. In particular, career regulations and mechanisms for recruitment, selection 
and promotion of teachers, are receiving a great deal of attention.
1 However, reforms in these 
areas have been hard to achieve, among other reasons due to the opposition of teachers’ unions 
to policies perceived as hurting their members.
2 
The objective of this study is to provide some empirical evidence on the effects of 
teachers’ unions on the quality of education in Argentina. Of particular interest are “education 
production functions” and the impact of teachers’ unions on variables that influence the learning 
experience of elementary students: days of class, teachers’ tenure status,
3  class size, budget 
allocations, and teachers’ satisfaction. Also considered are other factors, such as the special laws 
                                                           
1 For more details see the series of IADB studies in the project “Teachers in Latin America: Careers and Incentives,” 
which can be downloaded at www.iadb.org/res.  
2 Corrales (1998) notes that “The magnetism and high levels of organization of teachers’ unions, together with a 
union leadership that has a long-term horizon, no alternative career plan, no aversion to conflict, and a 
discriminating weapon against the government, explain why teachers’ unions are to be expected to be intensely 
active in resisting reforms.” See Murillo (1997) and Murillo and Maceira (2000) for further discussion of the 
political economy of reform in the social sectors and the role of unions. 
3 This paper uses “tenure status” (henceforth TENURE), to refer to whether the teacher has a permanent, full-right, 
assignment to that position, as opposed to a “temporary” assignment.  (In Spanish, titular as opposed to suplente.)   
  5and rules that regulate teachers’ careers and work environment, and their possible connection to 
the (political) role of unions. 
This study provides new descriptive statistics on teachers’ unions in Argentina and 
presents several empirical findings on the relation between unions and student performance. 
First, higher union density combined with union fragmentation and adversarial political 
alignments tends to decrease the effective number of class days, with an indirect negative effect 
on student performance. Second, there is a negative relation between union membership and job 
satisfaction, and students who have a more satisfied teacher perform better. Third, teacher tenure, 
a persistent union demand, has a positive effect on student performance. Fourth, unions have a 
positive effect on employment and thus, a negative effect on class size. Finally, education 
budgets and teachers’ wages are mainly determined by fiscal variables; provincial unions are 
basically irrelevant except that they increase the share of salaries in the education budget. These 
empirical findings provide mixed conclusions regarding the effect of unions on educational 
outcomes, but provide a first picture of union influence in the learning process. 
The paper is divided into six sections. Section 1 provides some brief background 
information on education in Argentina.  Section 2 presents a sketch of the analysis to follow.  
Section 3 provides a brief description of the education production function estimation for 
elementary school students in Argentina. Section 4 describes teachers’ unions and explains the 
empirical exercises to be performed to ascertain the impact of union characteristics on the 
variables that are important to explain educational outcomes.  Section 5 presents the empirical 
results on the effects of unions.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
1.  Background Information  
 
Argentina has relatively high schooling rates. The enrollment ratio in primary education is 97 
percent, literacy 96 percent and enrollment in secondary education 67 percent. The system has a 
total of 9.7 million students (70 percent in primary education), 650,000 teachers (540,000 
teaching positions) and 52,177 schools; 76 percent of total enrollment attends public institutions. 
Average spending per student is around $900 ($740 in the case of primary education), although 
there are large variations across provinces. 
 
 
  6Table 1. Public Expenditure on Education, 1997 
Province Millions  of 
US$ 
% of Total 
expenditure 
US$ per student Personnel expenditure/ 
total expenditure 
City of Bs. As.  924 29.4% 1,391 72.7%
Buenos Aires  3,230 30.7% 881 78.7%
Catamarca 135 28.2% 1,435 92.5%
Cordoba 739 26.1% 969 73.3%
Corrientes 209 23.0% 752 93.8%
Chaco 251 22.8% 912 90.3%
Chubut 145 20.9% 1,202 88.9%
Entre Rios  297 21.4% 947 83.4%
Formosa 135 16.6% 875 91.4%
Jujuy 166 30.9% 869 92.2%
La Pampa  113 22.5% 1,575 81.6%
La Rioja  110 25.5% 1,312 92.8%
Mendoza 362 30.0% 894 83.7%
Misiones 193 19.9% 672 97.8%
Neuquen 250 25.5% 1,687 86.3%
Rio Negro  182 25.9% 1,061 86.3%
Salta 202 23.1% 629 92.0%
San Juan  160 23.6% 1,001 88.1%
San Luis  95 25.5% 1,014 76.2%
Santa Cruz  141 20.4% 2,341 86.5%
Santa Fe  771 29.1% 961 74.9%
Sgo. del Estero  204 31.5% 962 98.5%
Tierra del Fuego  79 21.4% 2,566 78.4%
Tucuman 277 29.9% 829 86.4%
Total 9,370 27.2% 966 81.6%
 
Over 80 percent of spending is devoted to teachers’ salaries, although there is substantial 
inter-provincial variation, and this level is high relative to other countries (Table 2). This high 
percentage could be the result of union strength in defending the salary share of the budget in a 
context of fiscal restraint. This view is supported by the priority granted by teachers’ unions to 




                                                           
4 Low salaries and payment delay represent almost half of the concerns expressed by teachers’ unions. See Table 7. 
  7Table 2. Expenditure on Education: International Comparison (1997) 
Country Public  Expenditure  on 
education (as % of 
GNP) 
Expenditure on teachers wages as a 
% of total current education 
expenditure 
Student / 
Teacher ratio  
Duration
Argentina 3.5  84.1  17  10 
Australia 5.4  54.2  12  10 
Brazil 5.1  -  23  8 
Canada 6.9  62  16  10 
Chile 3.6  -  30  8 
Colombia 4.1  81.9  25  5 
Korea Rep.  3.7  -  31  9 
Mexico 4.9  -  28  6 
Peru 2.9  40.1  28  6 
Uruguay 3.3  41.5  20  6 
          Source: World Development Indicators. 
 
Responsibility for primary and secondary education has been decentralized at the 
provincial level (primary since 1978 and secondary in 1993). Indeed, even at the peak of 
centralization in 1952, only 43 percent of elementary schools, as opposed to 75 percent of 
secondary schools and 83 percent of vocational schools, were national. Federal Education Law 
No. 24,049 of 1993 regulates the distribution of responsibilities between the nation and the 
provinces, and the provinces now play the leading role in financial, pedagogical and 
administrative matters; as well as in labor relations and teachers’ career paths. The national 
government sets the national curriculum, evaluates the system, implements compensatory 
programs and promotes—with the provinces—teacher education programs.
5 The involvement of 
the province rather than the school, municipal or the national level in the running of Argentina’s 
educational system is high in international terms. The crucial role of the provincial level, as well 
as very limited school autonomy, is illustrated by the international comparison in Figure 1. 
                                                           
5 There is, however still an important element of centralization of political conflict over teachers’ wages.  The main 
federation CTERA has called several national strikes and mobilizations.  The most salient recent episode was the so-
called “carpa blanca,” a tent with teachers hunger-striking in front of the National Congress, which led to the 
approval of a special national tax on automobiles to finance wage increases for teachers throughout the country (the 
so-called incentivo docente, i.e., “teaching incentive”). 






































Source:  OECD, 1998
 
Because almost all schools depend on the provincial government, public education 
budgets, teachers’ salaries, and working conditions and regulations (Estatutos Docentes and 
Convenios Colectivos) are mainly decided in the subnational arena.  Hence, because education is 
decentralized at the provincial level and most unions are organized at the provincial level as well, 




2. Influence of Unions in Education: A Sketch of the Empirical Strategy  
 
There are several institutional features of the education system and of teachers’ unions in 
Argentina that differentiate it from the US system in a way that makes it virtually impossible to 
replicate the groundbreaking study by Hoxby (1996).
7 
Education is “decentralized” at the provincial level, and most unions are organized at the 
provincial level as well. Budgets, teacher’s salaries, working conditions and regulations 
                                                           
6 As described below, a micro-level relationship can also be traced between unions and teachers’ job satisfaction, 
which can have a direct impact on the learning process of individual students. 
  9(Estatutos Docentes and Convenios Colectivos) are negotiated between the provincial 
government and teachers’ unions and apply to all teachers and schools independently of their 
affiliation or participation in the negotiation process, or in the election of union leaders. 
Consequently, all schools located in the same province are affected by teachers’ unions, even 
those where teachers are not unionized. This institutional feature complicates the possibility of 
school-level cross-sectional analysis.
8 Hence, in order to look for the potential effect of unions on 
education, the most disaggregated level possible is that of the province in both the provincial 
political and labor-relations arena.
9 
However, of ultimate interest are education outcomes such as student learning. And 
learning depends not only on variables that are decided at the provincial level, but also on the 
socioeconomic characteristics of the student’s family, and on school/classroom factors. Hence, 
the analysis requires dealing with different levels of aggregation. 
The analytical / empirical strategy can be best understood by reference to Figure 2. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
7 One additional feature not emphasized in the text is that both unions’ rules and the law, particularly the Ley de 
Asociaciones Sindicales, do not require unions to operate under democratic rules. Under such circumstances it might 
be inappropriate to assume that the union’s objective function represents the preference of the “median” member. 
8 That is, even if information were available on whether particular teachers in a particular school are unionized, it is 
not clear whether that should be expected to have any impact on the relevant variables (such as student learning).  
Even if the empirical analysis would show an impact, it is unclear given the institutional features of the Argentine 
case whether that should be attributed to “union effects” or to personal characteristics of the teacher that are 
correlated with the decision of whether to affiliate.  Nicer people, more concerned about social issues, can be more 
likely to affiliate and these might be better teachers, or alternatively, they can be just card-carrying troublemakers 
with negative influence on learning.  This caveat qualifies, thus, the analysis of the “unionization”–“job satisfaction” 
link with the micro-level data mentioned in footnote 6. 
9 Of course, it is also quite likely that in the Argentine case one of the most important channels of union influence is 
in the National political arena, a hypothesis that will be addressed more indirectly, because of obvious empirical 
limitations. 

































  11This paper uses a data set that contains seventh-grade test scores in Mathematics and 
Language from a number of schools throughout the country; these can be matched to student 
questionnaires, teacher questionnaires and school-principal questionnaires to provide useful 
information about “inputs” to the education production function.  In a simplified manner, it can 
be postulated (as in the right side of Figure 2) that student achievement is a function:  
 
(1)  Yij = f ( Xj ; ej ; Zi ) 
 
where Yij is the score of student i  in school/classroom j; Xj is a vector of school/classroom 
variables (inputs), ej  is a vector of (possibly unmeasured) “teacher” variables (such as effort, or 
“quality of the match”) that are supposed to affect student learning, and Zi is a vector of 
socioeconomic characteristics of the student’s family. Presumably unions can affect some of the 
components of X or e, and hence, indirectly, educational outcomes. 
Moving towards the left in Figure 2, unions operate mostly at the political level and to 
some extent at the labor-relations level, and hence they can directly affect some provincial-level 
variables which themselves, are either some of the Xs, or determinants of some Xs or e’s. For 
instance they can have an impact on provincial education budgets, on budget composition, on 
teachers’ wages, on teacher/student ratios, on the quality of the match between teacher and 
school, on the number of hours of instruction, on the number of days of class, on strikes (and 
hence days of class lost, low morale, etc.), on whether wages to public teachers are paid on time, 
etc.
10 
There are several possible mechanisms/channels by which unions can affect those 
“intermediate” variables, although these mechanisms are somewhat different from those usually 
assumed in the “standard” empirical unions’ literature.  One important difference is that in most 
provinces, collective bargaining has not been a practice in the educational sector due to legal 
limitations on public sector collective bargaining, which lasted until 1990. As a result, unions 
sometimes choose political strategies of influence through the discussion of public rules 
(teachers’ statutes), of their work conditions or the representation in governance institutions, 
such as Qualification Boards, which affect promotion and tenure.
11 Indeed, in addition to their 
                                                           
10 Occasionally, provincial sector employees, including teachers, are paid several months late. This has been one 
important source of labor conflict in the education sector. 
11 The decisions on the professional career of teachers are handled by the teaching profession through Qualification 
Boards (Juntas de Calificaciones).  These boards use a system of points in which diplomas, tenure and courses 
  12industrial action (i.e., strikes), they also choose expressive protests, such as the carpa blanca to 
make their demands more effective. This political character of labor relations in the education 
sector is further reinforced by the attitudes of employers (i.e., provincial governments) and the 
fiscal consideration emerging from the complicated relationship between provincial and national 
governments in a federal country. In particular, the interactions between presidents, governors, 
and unions, which are sometimes of different political affiliation and have different incentives 
regarding budget allocation and political unrest, complicate the context in which the educational 
process is taking place. Hence, some are codetermined by more general political and even fiscal 
variables (left end of Figure 2). For example, days of class are affected by strikes, which in turn 
may sometimes come as a response to delays in wage payments, and whether that delay occurs 
and whether it leads to strikes will depend on the provincial fiscal situation as well as on the 
nature of the relationship between the provincial government and teachers’ unions. More 
generally, the nature of the relationship between political authorities and unions can explain 
some of the rigidities in teacher labor laws (such as the Estatutos Docentes).
12 
It can be postulated that the “intermediate variables” are a function of: 
 
(2)  Xjp = g ( Up  ; Wp ) 
 
 
where Xjp are those inputs that affect student performance and are presumably affected by the 
union’s behavior. (For example Xjp could be the number of class days in school j located in 
province p). Up is a vector of provincial teacher union characteristics; and Wp is a vector of 
control variables (e.g., the provincial fiscal situation). 
In order to explore the effect that teachers’ unions have on students’ performance given 
our data constraints, two steps were performed. The first was to estimate the education 
production function (equation 1) on individual and school-level microdata. The second was to 
run separate cross-provinces regressions for each of the X that are presumably affected by 
teacher unions.
13  This approach does not make it possible to claim a conclusive result on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
constitute the main factors.  Those applicants with the highest scores have the first right to select among open 
positions, and school authorities and parents have no voice in the selection process.  Presumably, teacher unions 
play an important role in some of the Juntas. 
12 See Spiller and Tommasi (2000) for a framework that explains overregulation as the outcome of the inability to 
strike efficient intertemporal political transactions. 
13 The system of equations (1) and (2) is recursive. Thus as long as the error terms in the two equations are 
independent each can be estimated separately.   
  13overall impact that unions have on education, but it provides evidence on the effect that unions 
have on some specific variables that affect student performance (i.e., class days, teacher’s job 
satisfaction, tenure and class size). Taking into account the characteristics of the data available, 
this is the most informative way to look at the data.
14 
The next section presents the estimation of the education production function (EPF). 
Sections 4 and 5 examine the effects of the variables measuring union characteristics on 
(intermediate) educational outcomes. 
 
3. Education Production Function Estimation 
 
Most economic studies of school effectiveness follow the Educational Production Function 
(EPF) approach, asking the question of which policy inputs can increase outputs. Personal, 
family and other factors are treated as inputs and the student performance as the output of this 
EPF.
15 
Educational Production Functions studies classify the factors that influence students’ 
performance as: 
a)  personal factors such as sex, race, etc.;  
b)  family factors such as socioeconomic level, family size and parents’ 
education; 
c)  factors relating to place of residence; 
d)  school and teacher factors, such as school structure, number of school 
days, teacher experience and teacher dedication. 
 
                                                           
14 There are at least two other approaches to computing the impact that unions have on students’ performance. The 
first is to estimate the reduced form of equations (1) and (2). While this strategy has the advantage of providing an 
estimate of the full effect of unions on education outcomes, it also has several disadvantages. First, we lose all the 
heterogeneity is lost across families, and to some extent across schools, since means within provinces must be used. 
Second, it is not possible to identify the partial effects of unions. From a theoretical perspective, unions affect 
education through several channels; for example, unions call for strikes and hence students have fewer class days 
and presumably perform worse; on the other hand, unions could also pressure the government for a higher education 
budget, leading to better performance. Lastly, another disadvantage of the reduced form estimation is the omitted 
variables problem. Since information is not available on provincial variables that might have important (direct or 
indirect) influence on student performance, this might induce biases in the coefficients of the union variables.  
The second approach consists of two steps. The first is to estimate the education production function 
including provincial dummies. The second is to regress provincial dummies’ coefficients on the union variables and 
controls. This approach has disadvantages similar to those of the first approach, but it also reduces significantly the 
number of observations (in the second regression only 24 observations are used).  
15 There are several critiques of this approach.  An excellent survey is Scheerens (1999). 
  14In order to analyze school production it is essential to employ adequate measures of 
outcomes.  This is not an easy task, since the objectives of education are multiple, and many of 
them hard to measure.  A majority of studies in the EPF tradition measure output by standardized 
achievement test scores, although others have employed other measures such as student attitudes, 
school attendance rate, and high school continuation or dropout rates. This study uses test 
scores.
16 
The problem in statistical terms is to describe the relationships between test scores, 
school and teacher processes and characteristics of the pupil intake. The econometric model that 
is estimated assumes a linear relationship between test scores and the factors included in the 
regression. 
Since 1993, the Ministry of Education has implemented a National Evaluation System in 
order to quantify students’ knowledge in a variety of subjects and reveal complementary 
information to analyze its determinants. The observational units are: the student, the student’s 
family, the student’s teachers and school. Different grades have been tested in different years, as 
shown below. 
 
Table 3. SINEC Surveys 
 
 Year 
Grade  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
3
rd     Lang.  Math  L & M  L & M   Math  L & M 
6
th         L & M  L & M    L & M 
7
th   L & M  L & M  L & M  L & M  L & M    L & M 
 
Only data corresponding to seventh-grade grade students attending public schools in 1997 
and 1999 are used in this paper. These years were chosen because there is reliable data on union 
variables for the period 1997-1999 (see next section). All private school observations are 
dropped because there is only one national private teachers’ union, which makes it virtually 
impossible to explore how private teacher unionism affects outcomes through a cross-province 
analysis. 
                                                           
16 It is worth pointing out that an overall reading of the use of EPF throughout the world provides an ambiguous 
picture, where results are sometime inconsistent and not very robust (Hanushek, 1986, Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin, 
1998, and Scheerens, 1999). This is particularly the case when the dependent variables are test scores. Still, the 
findings are constrained by data availability. 
  15The regression includes student and family factors such as parents’ education, 
kindergarten attendance and family wealth; classroom factors such as class size, peer effects and 
classroom structure; and teachers’ factors such as teacher experience, education, tenure, 
dedication, and job satisfaction. Finally considered are school factors such as class days, 
principal’s tenure and experience. 
Among the variables listed above, four factors deserve special consideration since they 
are potentially affected by teacher union behavior. These are class days, class size, teacher tenure 
and job satisfaction. The relation between class days and students’ scores is straightforward.  It is 
expected that more class days improve student performance. More complex are the relations 
between performance and class size, teachers’ tenure, and teachers’ job satisfaction.  One 
might expect a negative relation between class size and student learning.  However, this is a 
well-studied relationship,
17 and to date there is no conclusive evidence.
18  
The provincial teachers’ labor codes (Estatutos Docentes) are very complex and 
protectionist, particularly for tenured teachers. Firing tenured teachers is extremely difficult, and 
absence regulations very lenient.
19 Therefore, it could be argued that tenured teachers do not have 
the incentive to dedicate much effort to their work. However, it is also possible that the 
restrictions specified in the Estatutos prevent political discretion and provide a feeling of security 
to the tenured teacher, leading to better teaching quality. 
Finally, it is reasonable to expect that more satisfied teachers devote more effort to their 
duties, improving teaching quality.
20 However, because job satisfaction reflects both objective 
                                                           
17 For example Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin (1998). 
18 Many econometric studies show an insignificant effect. Also, as Hanushek observes (as cited by Bracey, 1998) 
“Japanese class sizes are much larger than U.S. class sizes. Japanese students performance is, on average, much 
better than U.S. students’’ performance.” On the other hand, in the United States a series of experiments undertaken 
in recent years have proven quite the contrary (such as the California initiative and the Tennessee experiment). 
Some of these approximations state that the effects differ by level of the class size variable, and therefore equal 
effects should not be expected for class sizes of 20 students and class sizes of 15 or lower (Nye, Hedges and 
Konstantopoulos, 1999). Additionally, Gursky (1998) indicates that reducing class size can improve student 
achievement, particularly in earlier grades and low-achieving and low-income students. 
19 There are jurisdictions, such as the City of Buenos Aires or the province of Chaco, where tenured teachers can 
take, on average, more than one hundred absence days during one year. 
20 Hammermesh (1999) argues that a more satisfied worker is more likely to invest in firm-specific human capital 
and increase his commitment. Locke (1976) suggests that job satisfaction could be used as a proxy to capture aspects 
of the workplace, such us mode of supervision, physical work conditions, and so forth that are not generally 
measured on data files, and that could have an impact on outcomes such as workers’ productivity. He also suggests 
that job satisfaction could impact on workers’ mental health and hence affect her productivity. 
  16and subjective factors, such as teacher’s psychological state, it is more complex to interpret than 
standard economic variables.
21 
Table 4 presents the results for the 1997 math test score. A summary of the other three 
regressions, variable descriptions and basic statistics are in Appendix 1. 
 
Table 4. Regression Result 
Dependent Variable: log of 1997 mathematics test score 
(OLS clustered by School) 
 Variable  Coefficient t-value 
School  Class Days  0.004 4.076 
Factors  Principal tenure (yes=1, no=0) 0.029 1.076 
 Principal  experience  0.012 0.849 
 Job  Satisfaction  0.041 2.246 
Teacher’s  Tenure (yes=1, no=0)  0.018 0.761 
Factors Teacher  Dedication  0.020 0.919 
 Teacher  Experience  0.013 1.776 
 Teacher  Education  0.011 0.831 
 Gender  (female=1)  -0.019 2.051 
 Father  Education  -0.002 0.076 
Student   Mother Education  0.012 3.400 
and Kindergarten  0.043 2.871 
Family Family  size  -0.012 2.708 
 Repeated  grade  -0.158 12.714 
 Wealth  0.00002 2.700 
  Students/Teacher 0.004 1.859 
Classroom Positive Peer effect   0.046 6.211 
Factors  Negative Peer effect (-)  -0.015 1.256 
 Classroom  Structure  0.008 1.816 
 Observations  11791  
 R2  0.14  
 
The findings indicate that students perform better when they have more class days and 
when their teacher is more satisfied with her job. The coefficients are highly significant in the 
four regressions (math and language, 1997 and 1999). One additional day of class results in an 
improvement of approximately 0.4 percent in student performance.
22 
                                                           
21 There is also the possibility of reverse causation: A teacher assigned to smart, well-behaved students may become 
more satisfied.
 
22 In Argentina, the average number of class days per year was 157 days in 1997, almost 20 percent less than in 
OECD counties.  
  17There is not a clear relation between student performance and class size. While the 
coefficients for the 1997 language and math evaluations (shown above) are positive, there is a 
negative and statistically significant relation for the 1999 tests (see Appendix 1). 
Regarding teacher tenure, higher scores are found among those students who have a 
tenured teacher (even after controlling for teacher experience). However, there are three reasons 
to interpret this result with caution: First, the coefficient is not statistically significant in any of 
the four evaluations. Second, it could be that tenure improves teacher performance, or it could 
just be that better teachers are awarded tenure. Finally, it is important to note that the National 
Evaluation Survey only includes those teachers who are actually teaching on the day the 
evaluation is conducted; all those teachers who are on leave of absence are not surveyed.  
It additionally appears that the sample might have a severe bias. The analysis of the 
Estatutos Docentes shows that tenured teachers have an impressive number of leave days they 
can take during the year compared to interinos and suplentes. Thus, it can is presumed that being 
tenured increases the incentives/odds that the teacher is on leave.
23 Therefore, while there is 
evidence that students who have an active tenured teacher perform better than those who have an 
active non-tenured teacher, it cannot be claimed with a high level of confidence that “tenuring” 
teachers is an appropriate policy to improve education quality. 
 




Argentine teachers’ unions, organized mainly at the provincial level, have shown a very militant 
stance. Approximately 350,000 teachers are unionized, showing one of the highest unionization 
rates (55 percent) in the country.
24 Additionally, teachers’ unions have not only been active in the 
development of the educational system, but have also organized more demonstrations and strikes 
than most other sectors.
25 
                                                           
23 Regrettably, it is impossible to compare the ratio (active tenure teachers / total active teachers) relative to (tenured 
teachers / total teachers) using census data. The last national survey, conducted in 1994, shows that 57 percent of 
teachers are tenured. The 1997 and 1999 samples of active teachers show that 61 percent and 53 percent, 
respectively, of active teachers are tenured. 
24 The unionization rate for the whole working force has been estimated in 28 percent. 
 
25 Among them, the marcha blanca and the carpa blanca had a significant impact. The marcha blanca took place in 
1988, and was the major historical teachers mobilization. The carpa blanca was set up by teachers in front of 
Congress in 1997 in demand of a higher public education budget. The carpa blanca influenced political discourse 




Sector 1990 Sector  1988
    
Civil Service   25%  Teachers 29% Civil Service  26%
Teachers 23%  Civil Service  14% Teachers 15%
Transport workers  7%  Steelworkers  6% Physicians  4%
Municipal 
employees 
5% Mechanicals  4% Municipal employees  4%
Energy  5%  Railway carmen  4% Railway carmen  3%
Steelworkers 4%  Banking  3% Banking  3%
Aeronautics 3%  Physicians  3% Health  2%
Banking  3%  Paper Mill workers  2% Oil workers  2%
Oil workers  3%  Port workers  1% Postmen  2%
Mechanicals 3%  Meat-cutters  1% Port  workers  2%
Source: Centro de Estudios para la Nueva Mayoría. 
 
The origins of teachers’ unions can be traced to the end of the nineteenth century. In 1892 
the Liga de Maestros, Argentina’s first teacher association, was established in the province of 
San Juan. Other provincial teacher associations followed in Buenos Aires, Cordoba, Tucuman, 
Mendoza, Corrientes, Santiago del Estero, Misiones, Entre Rios, Catarmarca and Rio Negro, 
which failed several times to organize a national federation. The first national organization, the 
Union of the Argentine Teacher, was created in 1950 under the influence of the Peronist 
government and later became the UDA (Union of Argentine Teachers).
26 Hence, most of 
teachers’ organizations created thereafter emerged in a decentralized fashion with some 
exceptions, such as UDA and AMET (Association of Teachers of Technical Schools), which 
affiliate teachers under national jurisdiction and had a national coverage from the start. A group 
of 147 provincial unions was founded in 1973, the Confederation CTERA (Central de 
Trabajadores de la Educación de la República Argentina). CTERA is the largest teacher 
organization in Argentina and has 200,000 members nationwide. Because it was founded in an 
attempt to reduce the fragmentation of the sector, successive mergers reduced their component 
unions to a single union per province. This confederation of provincial unions, which often had 
different partisan sympathies, opposed the education policies of both Menem administrations and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and finally enabled the teachers’ union to participate in the design and Congressional approval of an extremely 
polemic financial law aimed at increasing teachers’ salaries. (For a detailed analysis see Behrend, 1999). 
26 See Vásquez and Balduzzi (2000).  
 
  19the Federal Education Law.
27 Additionally, its national leadership has sought collective 
centralization of demands to negotiate with the central government and had attempted to 
implement national collective bargaining after the approval of new labor relations regulations for 
the public sector in 1990.  
CTERA, however, competes with other unions in almost every province. Rival provincial 
unions, together with SADOP (the private teacher’s union), UDA and AMET have opposed 
some of CTERA’s strategies. The fragmentation of the sector, thus, was not solved by CTERA 
and, at the provincial level, there are currently more than 150 unions that operate in primary and 
public education. In addition to political diversity, teachers’ unions present significant 
differences across provinces in their density, legal recognition, and political ideology. Table 6 
presents some information on teachers’ unions in the provinces. 
 
Table 6. Teachers’ Unions (Primary and Public Education, 1999) 






Buenos Aires  96  14  100,965 (P, L) 
Catamarca 2 0  2540 (P) 
Chaco 9  1  13,856 (P,  L) 
Chubut 1  1  4,178 P 
City of Bs. As.  8  1  21,299 P 
Cordoba 5  2  27,874 (P,L) 
Corrientes 4 1  9,075 (P,L) 
Entre Rios  1  1  17,651 P 
Formosa 6  0 1,718 (P,L) 
Jujuy 1  1  3,478 P 
La Pampa  1  0  2,785 P 
La Rioja  1  0  3,735 P 
Mendoza 1  1  11,835 P 
Misiones 1  1 6,370 P 
Neuquen 1  1 7,492 P 
Rio Negro  1  1  8,214 P 
 
                                                           
27 CTERA joined the Peronist CGT (General Confederation of Labor) in the mid-1980s after Mary Sánchez, a 
Peronist leader, won the national elections of the union. However, in 1989, after President Menem abandoned his 
populist campaign promises, CTERA joined the anti-government CGT Azopardo first and later founded with other 
public sector unions the Congress of Argentine Workers (CTA) with a clear opposition stance while Mary Sánchez 
left the Peronists and joined a new opposition party. 
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  Table 6., continued        






Salta 3  1  15,025 P 
San Juan  1  1  5,621 P 
San Luis  1  0  1,510 P 
Santa Cruz  1  1  3,535 P 
Santa Fe  1  1  29,344 P 
Santiago del Estero  4  1  4,646 P 
Tierra del Fuego  1  0  790 P 
Tucuman 1  1 8,988 P 
      
Note: P for the province and L for local. (*See note 30 regarding affiliates) 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from Dirección Nacional de Asociaciones Sindicales. 
 
4.2 Data 
This section reviews the principal data sources used in this study to analyze the impact of 
teachers’ unions on education in Argentina (Appendix 2 contains additional details). Of 
particular interest is that, despite the limitations of the data, this is the first database of its kind 
for the empirical study of teachers’ unions in Argentina. Two sources have been used. The first is 
the official record of unions and affiliates provided by the Ministry of Labor, and the second is 
the Encuesta de Desarrollo Social, run by the Ministry of Social Development.  
In the Ministry of Labor’s data set, the unit of analysis is the union. The information 
includes the number of affiliates to the union, its legal status, and its jurisdictional coverage. The 
data set also provides some information about how these variables have changed during the last 
decade. The Encuesta de Desarrollo Social is a household survey with national coverage 
conducted in 1997 with more than 70,000 observations, where approximately 1,600 people 
reported their occupations as teachers. This survey makes it possible to determine several 
characteristics of teachers, including whether he/she participates in a labor union and the 
province where he/she lives. These two data sets, along with some interview-derived 
information, are used to construct indexes of the characteristics of teacher unionism in each 
province. 
In order to know teachers’ unions’ objectives and demands, two sources are used. The 
first is a review of the corresponding literature on public sector unionism. The second consists of 
interviews and unions’ internal documents where demands and goals are reported. From those 
documents it is evident that their main concern is wages. Low salaries and delays in payment are 
  21the most important issues for teachers’ unions (All of the 15 provincial unions surveyed are 
concern about salaries, representing almost half of total demands reported). Tenure and job 
security are also important issues according to what unions report. 
 
Table 7. Reported Concerns of Union Members 
Demand Percentage  of  provincial 
unions demanding 
Percentage of total 
demands reported 
Salaries  100 %  41 % 
Tenuring-Absence days  47 %   21 % 
Job security  33 %  11 % 
Employment  33 %  9 % 
Health insurance  20 %  7 % 
Unions Participation*  33 %  7 % 
Teacher Training  13 %  5 % 
Source: Own elaboration based on CTERA (2000), Informe de la Situación en todas las Provincias,  
which covers 15 provinces. 
* Includes demands for a higher union participation in the education system, such as collective bargaining 
and Juntas de Clasificación. 
 
 
                                                          
4.3 Estimating Union Influence 
 
As explained above, a number of institutional features of the education system and of teacher 
unionization in Argentina prevent the type of analysis disaggregated at the level of, say, school 
or school district, such as has been provided in the United States. For that reason most of the 
analysis of the impact of unions is performed at the provincial level. 
The “intermediate variables” that this paper attempts to relate to (provincial level) union 
characteristics are variables that: (a) are significant predictors (or possible determinants of 
significant predictors) of educational outcomes in the education production function estimation, 
and (b) could be related to the theories on union effects. These include:  days of class, teacher’s 
tenure status, class size, and budget size and composition. Additionally, there is one variable 
found to be significant in the education production function, which is teacher satisfaction, for 




28There are other channels for union effects such as the Estatutos Docentes and of Juntas de Clasificaciones.  
Estatutos Docentes are the by-laws ruling labor relations, which define job stability, leaves of absence, etc.  These 
rules are believed to have a large impact on teachers’ incentives, and teachers’ unions report to care about them. The 
  22Union Variables 
 
Most of the “intermediate” variables under consideration (i.e., days lost, tenure, budget 
allocation) are linked to the interaction between unions and their employers—in the Argentine 
case, provincial governments. Hence these variables are affected by characteristics of the unions 
and by their political relationship to the provincial government. Presently considered is the 
impact of union strength, coordination, legal recognition, and political alignment on the 
(intermediate) dependent variables under study. 
 
Strength: Measures of both union density (members/teachers) and of union participation 
(teachers answering that they have union participation) are considered. Membership or density is 
a traditional measure of union strength, which increases not only the effect of work stoppages but 
also provides financial resources for the organization (Golden 1997, Olson 1971).  
The relationship between strength and strike propensity is not obvious. Following Hicks’s 
paradox on the impossibility of explaining strikes when there is complete information, strikes are 
usually explained as a result of asymmetric information (Kennan, 1986). In that case, strikes can 
result from the search for information by one of two parties. For instance, the union wants to 
know how much the employer would give in or the employer wants to know the concession 
threshold of the union (Hayes, 1984). Tsebelis and Lange (1995) thus model strikes as “bluffing” 
from unions that try to get better conditions from employers than what their real strength allows 
them. This interpretation also follows Hicks’s view that the striking union may be trying to 
maintain a “reputation for toughness” (Kennan, 1986). In this case, strikes occur when employers 
try to probe the union real strength. This argument also predicts that the propensity for strikes 
should be lower for strong unions, which do not need to bluff, or for weak unions, which cannot 
bluff, but higher for those in between. In particular, those unions whose density is decreasing and 
whose strength is unclear, but which still have a reputation for toughness, should be more prone 
to strike. The alternative view of strikes poses that union strength facilitates collective action and 
increases the propensity of the union to strike by increasing its ability to obtain concession by 
striking (Franzosi, 1995). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Junta de Calificaciones, where unions have representatives, are the boards in charge of teacher’s evaluation and 
promotion. These issues are left for further work. 
  23Regarding the other dependent variables, the relation between union density and union 
demands (such as tenure, budget allocation, and employment) is more straightforward; these are 
traditional goals of unions. Stronger unions are in a better position to bargain with the 
government over these issues controlling for other fiscal and legal factors (Freeman and Medoff, 
1986). 
 
Fragmentation/Coordination: It can be assumed that coordination is more complicated with 
more than a single union having to bargain with the provincial government. Coordination 
problems tend to increase the propensity to strike because they make bargaining more difficult, 
in particular if at least one of the unions is belligerent (Golden, 1993; Murillo and Maceira, 
2000). In this case, although each union is weak, they are more likely to go on strike due to 
difficulties in coordinating negotiations and their incentives to appear as more effective than 
their rivals in a sector where employees are discontented with salaries and work conditions.  The 
existence of multiple unions thus makes coordination more difficult and weakens their 
bargaining power. Hence, other things being equal (e.g., density, sector, laws), a monopolistic 
union is stronger than multiple competing unions in the same sector. For that reason, 
monopolistic unions are more likely to obtain their demands regarding teachers’ tenure, budget 
allocation, employment, and even policy preferences. However, their demands or policy 
preference can be the result of coordination problems, which combined with different political 
alignments, can radicalize the positions of teachers’ unions regarding policy issues in addition to 
making bargaining more difficult.
29 
 
Recognition:  Also considered is the legal status of the union (if the union is inscripta or if it has 
personería gremial). In Argentina, those unions with personería gremial have several exclusive 
rights, such as representing all workers in collective negotiations, enforce the labor legislation 
and social security regulations, and cooperate with the government in dealing with problems 
                                                           
29 In the case of very large provinces, unions are discarded that include less than 10 percent of affiliated teachers, 
because those unions are assumed to be either too small or specialized to guide a coordinated action against the 
provincial government.  
  24affecting workers.
30 It is therefore presumed that in those provinces where the principal teacher 
union has personería gremial, the union is more likely to obtain its demands.  
 
Political alignment: The political alignment of teachers’ unions can induce a propensity to 
strike by providing national coverage, which makes unions more “strike-prone” according to 
Golden (1998). Alternatively, it can influence the union attitude towards the government of the 
provinces based on the provincial and national political dynamics because channels of 
communication and trust based on a long-term relationship where previous iterations were 
beneficial for both parties (Murillo and Maceira, 2000). This second argument follows the 
literature on “power resources” (Korpi, 1978) and the “political exchange” (Pizzorno, 1978)—
that is, the idea that when unions lack political access to an allied government they are more 
likely to use industrial resources, such as strikes. Hence, it would be expected that a positive 
political alignment with the government increases trust and communication between the 
teachers’ union and the government, facilitating bargaining rather than striking. It can also 
influence the attitudes of union leaders and the formation of preferences regarding policies of 
uncertain effect based on the politically created trust. The opposite is true for the lack of positive 
political alignments. 
In Argentina, membership in CTERA (which rejected Menem’s policies at the national 
level) interacting with a Peronist or conservative government should increase the propensity of 
the union to strike. Additionally explored will be the combination of political alignment and 
union fragmentation, following the argument that when political alignment facilitates trust 
between the provincial government and the union, union monopoly induces restraint and 
negotiation. However, union fragmentation contributes to increasing conflict even when some of 
the unions have a good relationship with the provincial government because they are afraid of 
being singled out as “sold-out” by rival unions in front of teachers (Murillo and Maceira, 2000). 
Additionally, the construction of the index of political alignment considered the diversity in 
partisan affiliations in CTERA unions across provinces as well as the existence of alternative 
unions and their own political alignments. 
 
                                                           
30 Unions that are only inscriptas do not have any of the rights mentioned. They are, however, also allowed to call 
for strikes and collect contributions from their members. 
  25Operationalizing the variables: To summarize, there are four key aspects that describe the 
characteristics of teacher unionism in each province: the number of members, the number of 
unions, their legal status and their political relation with the government. Table 8 provides a 
description of the variables used in the empirical estimation: 
 
 Table 8. Union Variables Description 
Variable Description  Source 
Participation  Percentage of teachers who report 




31  Affiliates/Teachers ratio  Ministry of Labor 
Fragmentation  Number of unions per province with more 
than 10% of affiliated teachers. 
Ministry of Labor 
Fragmentation II  Unions per 10 thousand teachers.  Ministry of Labor 
Recognition  Legal status. Is a dummy variable, where 1 
means that the union has legal monopoly 
(personeria gremial). 




Political Alignment between the principal 
union and the governor. Values range from 
to 0 to 1, where 0 means a highly 
conflictive relation. 
Interviews with 
union leaders and 
experts, and press 
information 
See Appendix 2 for more details. 




i. Lost  Days: The section on EPF estimation describes the impact of days of class on 
student performance. The relationship between union influence and lost days is relatively 
straightforward. The number of effective class days is affected by strikes. Unions are needed to 
                                                           
31 A note should be devoted to the operationalization of union density. One natural measure would have been the 
affiliates/teachers ratio (membership).  However, the official record of affiliates provided by the Ministry of Labor 
presents several problems: For some unions there is no information about affiliation; there are also some cases 
where a single provincial unions present a number of affiliates higher than the total number of provincial teachers. 
Thus, “participation” is used as a proxy of union density instead of “membership” in the regressions. 
32 In most provinces, there is only one teachers union. In those where there are more than one, only the most 
important union (determined by density and legal status) is considered. Finally, in those provinces where any union 
could be defined as the principal one (such as in Buenos Aires, where two unions have almost equal membership), 
“Political Alignment” is computed by taking the average political relation between the governor and the unions. 
A value of 1 is assigned to those provinces where the main union is affiliated with CTERA (a founding 
member of the left wing FREPASO party) and the governor is Peronist or right wing, with the exception of 
provinces where the union leaders were politically close to the local Peronist party. Conversely, those cases where 
the governor’s party is center-left (UCR or ALIANZA) and the union is affiliated with CTERA, were assigned 
lower values ranging from 0.33 to 0.66, depending on how specialists have characterized union leaders local 
  26organize a strike although they need to have a reason to call their members into a work stoppage. 
Hence, the employer, in this case provincial governments, also has an impact on the emergence 
of conflicts in the education sector. For instance, delay in the payment of salaries provoked the 
reaction of public sector workers and teachers in many cases, following the argument that it is 
not low salaries, but rather the absence of income that is a source of mobilization (Scott, 1976). 
Hence, the loss of class days results from the interaction between provincial governments and 
teachers’ unions; this effect will be controlled for with variables such as delay in payments. 
Additionally, other variables affect the cost of striking and thus, the capacity of unions to call for 
work stoppages. In particular, attendance bonuses have an impact on the cost for individual 
teachers and will be used as control variables.
33 
 
ii. Teacher  Tenure: According to the results of the EPF, teachers’ tenure has a positive 
effect on student performance. Unions generally demand tenure for teachers. In fact, 
“titularización” or “tenuring” is the second most mentioned demand of CTERA following 
wages.
34 Unions demand tenure for their members because temporary employees are in a more 
precarious situation in terms of rights and also in terms of the risks they are willing to bear in 
collective action. Hence, tenure not only benefits temporary teachers, but also increases the 
homogeneity among union members and reduces the risks of striking because it is usually 
associated with job stability, thus making collective action easier for unions.  
 
iii. Class  Size: Public sector unions have a preference for a larger workforce. A growth in 
employment implies a larger constituency to represent that can increase the strength of the union, 
in particular in a sector characterized by job stability and where the salaries are defined in fiscal 
and political terms rather than according to productivity, as they are for tradable sectors. 
Additionally, teachers’ unions have traditionally demanded a low teacher/student ratio to 
improve the work conditions of their affiliates. Of present concern is the impact of their demand 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
strategy. Finally, a value of 0 is assigned to those provinces where the main union is not affiliated with CTERA and 
has a historically close relationship with the ruling local party. Teacher union experts confirmed the coding. 
33 There are significant differences among provinces in this regard. For instance, the attendance bonus in Santa Cruz 
represents one third of the basic salary, but in Neuquen the bonus does not exist. 
34 For example, SUTEBA (one of the main teacher’s union in Buenos Aires) claims: “The Ley de Titularización was 
finally approved. We obtain job security for more than 40,000 teachers in Buenos Aires. It’s a triumph for 
SUTEBA, thanks to the unity and organization of our union. To pass the law we had to confront the government and 
  27for enlarging employment in the education sector, and whether larger employment results in a 
smaller student/teacher ratio. That is, if they demand increasing employment but also obtained 
easier conditions for leaves or new employment results in a expansion of administrative 
positions, it is possible that the student/teacher ratio remains unchanged. Hence, the effect of 
unions on the effective student/teacher ratio is tested. 
 
 
iv. Education  Budget   We cannot derive a direct effect from budget allocation to the 
education function defined above. However, the education budget should have an indirect effect 
in the learning process. Hoxby (1996) argues that whether unions perform a rent- seeking role or 
a collective voice role, they are always expected to increase the overall budget. Teachers’ unions 
also affect the budget composition, pressing for higher wages. Thus, strong unions should lead to 
higher education budgets and salaries, or at least to a higher allocation of salaries in the 
education budget. Of particular interest is the effect of the present measures of union 
characteristics on the expenditures per student in each province, to assess their indirect impact on 
student performance. 
 
v. Job  satisfaction: According to the results of the education production function, teachers’ 
satisfaction has a positive effect on students performance. But what is the impact of unions on 
job satisfaction? Unions are supposed to improve the working conditions of the workers covered, 
who should therefore express greater satisfaction with their jobs than otherwise comparable 
nonunion workers. However, most empirical studies have found a negative relation between 
unionized workers and job satisfaction.
35 Several reasons might explain this result. It is important 
to note that job satisfaction is a subjective variable,
36 so it is not necessarily related to the 
“objective” conditions of each employee relative to others (e.g., lower wages, poorer working 
conditions). Freeman and Medoff (1986) argue that unions galvanize worker discontent in order 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the provincial legislature, but also the Federación Sarmiento (the other main teacher union in Buenos Aires) who 
were against the interests of the teachers.” (Authors’ translation from SUTEBA’s web page, www.suteba.org.ar) 
35 Freeman (1977), Freeman and Medoff (1986).  
36  According to Locke (1976), job satisfaction depends not only on the objective circumstances in which an 
individual finds himself but also on his psychological state and thus on aspirations, willingness to voice discontent, 
the hypothetical alternatives to which the current job is compared, and so forth. Kalleberg (1977) provides a similar 
definition from the sociological perspective. He argues that job satisfaction depends on the personality of the worker 
  28to make a strong case in negotiations with management. However, it is also possible that 
unionized workers report less satisfaction because they are truly worse off. As emphasized 
earlier, these measures of “unionization” at the individual level might be capturing personal 
characteristics of the worker. For instance, teachers who are more prone to conflict and 




•  More strikes (and fewer class days) are expected in the cases in which union density is high 
in combination with legal recognition and the lack of political alignment between teachers’ 
union and the provincial governor. More strikes are also expected in those provinces where 
unionism is fragmented. Membership provides unions with the ability to call strikes 
(Franzosi, 1995), whereas union fragmentation and the lack of political alignment increase 
the incentives for conflict due to the lack of trust and coordination problems that make 
negotiation more difficult. 
•  As teachers’ unions demand tenure, it is expected that stronger unions (in terms of density, 
union monopoly and legal recognition) will be more effective in achieving tenure for their 
members. 
•  Stronger unions are expected to be more able to increase employment and therefore to reduce 
class size. 
•  It is expected that stronger unions in terms of density, union monopoly and legal recognition 
have the ability to obtain higher allocations of the education budget to salaries and higher 
education budgets. Positive political alignments should enhance the bargaining power of 
monopolistic unions. In contrast, union fragmentation and lower density are expected to 
result in lower education budgets and wages.  
•  There is no particular expectation regarding the relation between union membership and job 
satisfaction. While unions are supposed to improve teachers working conditions and hence 
improve their satisfaction, there are several reasons to expect a negative correlation. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and on the nature of the job he performs (which includes wages, fringe benefits, hours of work, degree of control, 
promotional opportunities, etc).  
  295.  Empirical Results 
 
As discussed in a previous section, students’ scores are higher when they have more class days, 
when teachers are satisfied with their job, and when they have tenure. This section attempts to 
provide some new evidence on the relation between teacher union characteristics and these 
intermediate outcomes. 
Regrettably there is no data set containing information on both students’ performance and 
teacher unions in Argentina. But there are also certain characteristics in the labor relations in 
education that require a more aggregate analysis. Therefore an “indirect approach” (as explained 
in Section 2) is the most appropriate methodology to explore the relation between students 
performance and unionism. 
In addition, this section also analyzes factors such as education budgets and teachers’ 
salaries. These are among the most-reported concerns of unions members, and it is presumed that 
they could have an impact on student performance.
37  
 
5.1 Lost Days and Strikes 
 
More strikes (and thus fewer class days) are expected in those provinces where teacher unions 
are fragmented, have legal recognition, higher density, and a conflictive relation with the 
provincial government. In addition, attendance bonuses are expected to have a negative effect on 
strikes, and payment delays are expected to have a positive effect. 
Complete information about teacher strikes in Argentina was not available before this 
study was begun. On the basis of searching and merging different sources of information, 
though, the variable STRIKES was constructed for the period 1997-1999.
38 STRIKESit measures 
the number of lost days by province, and by year, due to teacher strikes. The variable exhibits 
high variation across provinces; in the province of Neuquen, for example, an average of 20 days 
per year were lost due to teacher strikes, while in Santa Cruz there were almost no strikes. 
Variation over time of provincial averages is lower: The average number of class days lost due to 
strikes per province was 5.0 during 1997, 4.7 in 1998 and 8.7 in 1999. 
                                                           
37 The last link is an issue that needs further work. Intuitively, it seems obvious that higher expenditure per pupil 
should improve performance, but if the quality of education is inadequate, increasing expenditures should not 
necessary improve performance (IADB, 1996). In Argentina, it is also not obvious that higher wages would improve 
teachers’ effort and productivity since there are several barriers that restrict the selection of teachers.  
38 For more details see Appendix 2. 
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Table 9. Class Days Lost due to Strikes 
Provinces grouped 
by number of class 












Less than 3 days  1.2 3.1 1.3 0.44
Between 3 and 10  4.8 4.3 1.6 0.39
More than 10 days  17.6 7.2 1.4 0.18
Source: CEDI. 
 
Table 9 groups the provinces according to the annual average number of class days lost 
due to teachers’ unions strikes during the period 1997-1999. Higher union density and a more 
hostile political relation with the government is observed in those provinces with more class days 
lost. 
While the previous table illustrates the potential relation between teacher’s union 
characteristics and strikes, we need to control the results for other, presumably important factors 
such as attendance bonus and payment delays (Delays).




Table 10. Regression Result 
Dependent variable: STRIKES 
OLS robust 
Variable Coefficient t-value 
Participation 0.40 2.53 
Union Fragmentation  1.24 2.79 
Recognition 0.54 0.45 
Political Alignment  -4.12 -2.96 
Delay 0.77 8.92 
Attendance bonus  -0.22 -3.58 
Constant -1.74 -0.99 
R-adjusted 0.90  
Observations 24  
 
                                                           
39 Regrettably, data on wage payment delays for public sector teachers does not exist. On the basis of discussions 
with union leaders and public officials, the number of provincial civil service strikes is used as a proxy for payment 
delays. 
40 Panel data specifications are discarded since most of the explanatory variables do not change over time.  
  31There is evidence suggesting that higher density, union fragmentation and a hostile 
political relation with the government result in more strikes.
41 A 10 percentage point increase in 
union density results in a reduction of 4 class days. In those provinces where there are two 
unions, students have 1.2 fewer class days compared to those provinces with only one union. 
Finally, in those provinces where there is a highly hostile political relation between the governor 
and teachers’ unions, there are 4.1 fewer class days than in those provinces with no conflict.     
Taking into account the positive effect that class days have on student performance, there 
is a reason to criticize the role unions play. However, union leaders argue that strikes are an 
instrument for improving teachers’ working conditions and increasing the education budget, and 
consequently could lead to a better education system. While the validity of this claim could not 
be determined, the results show that the means unions use to obtain their demands have negative 
effects on students learning. 
There is also evidence that attendance bonus and payment delays are significant factors in 
explaining strikes. The variable “Delay” is clearly the most important explanatory variable in the 
regression, since most of the variation in strikes across provinces is explained by payment 
delays.






Unions report an important concern with “tenuring.” Therefore, a higher proportion of tenured 
teachers (compared to suplentes and interinos) is expected in those provinces where unionism is 
“stronger” (higher density, lower fragmentation and legal recognition). Regarding the relation 
                                                           
41 The coefficient for “recognition” is positive but not significant. 
42 When “delay” is taken out of the regression, the R-adjusted reduces to 0.54. 
43 In Argentina, teacher’s tenuring is regulated by the Estatutos Docentes and done in an individual basis. The 
procedure is quite similar across provinces: Only those teachers that satisfy certain conditions, such as age, 
education, and training courses—and in some cases only those who pass an examination—can be tenured. In some 
provinces,  the Junta de Calificaciones (where unions have representatives) are the boards in charge of the 
evaluation. However, this mechanism is usually delayed as a consequence of bureaucractic procedures or political 
convenience. As a matter of fact, a significant proportion of teachers have been tenured through a different 
mechanism: Leyes de Titularización (i.e. “Tenuring Laws”). These laws apply to hundreds or even thousands of 
teachers at the same time and do not require teachers to fulfill any condition (such as age or education) in order to be 
tenured. Tenuring laws are usually consequence of the pressure exercised by teacher unions on the provincial 
government (see note 33). It is presumed that those teachers who have been awarded tenure through the first 
mechanism might be the best teachers, but that might not be the case for those teachers who have been tenured 
through the “tenuring laws.” In order to analyze the impact that unions have on the “tenuring” process, it is 
  32between tenure and union political alignment, governors who have a more conflictive political 
relation with unions are considered to be less likely to accept unions’ demands, leading to a 
lower number of tenured teachers. 
Regrettably, reliable data on teacher tenure is available only for the year 1994 (See Table 
21 in Appendix), so strong evidence cannot be provided on the relation between union 
characteristics and teacher tenure. Table 11 correlates the variable TENURE
44 with different 
characteristics of unions. 
 
Table 11. Tenure and Unions Characteristics 
Correlation Coefficient 
Unions Characteristics  TENURE 
Membership 0.11 
Participation -0.26 
Fragmentation   0.15 
Fragmentation II  -0.45 
Recognition   0.49 
Political Alignment  0.07 
 
The results are neither robust n,or clear. Political Alignment and legal recognition are 
positively associated with TENURE as expected, but only the last coefficient is clearly different 
from zero. Union fragmentation and density are negatively or positively correlated with 
TENURE depending upon the proxy that is used. 
 
5.3 Class Size  
 
Teacher unions bargain for higher employment. Therefore, we expect a lower number of students 
per teacher in those provinces where unions have higher density and lower fragmentation.  These 
expectations seem to be borne out by the data, as shown in Table 12. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
necessary to consider their effect on both the Juntas de Clasificación and the legislative process (Tenuring Laws). 
This issue is left for further work.  
44 TENURE is defined as the percentage of tenured teachers over the total number of teachers in each province. 
  33Table 12. Class Size and Unions Characteristics 
Provinces grouped according to 
the students per teacher ratio 
Average number 






Less than 15 students per 
teacher 
13.4 6.5 %  1.2
Between 15 and 18  16.6 3.2 %  1.1
More than 18  19.4 3.7 %  1.9




While teacher union characteristics are probably important factors explaining the 
students/teacher ratio, there are also other variables that should be considered, such as the 
provincial fiscal situation or regional GDP per capita.  
Regarding the econometric specification, the same methodology is applied as that used in 
the STRIKES regression (pooling the original panel across provinces). 
 
Table 13. Regression Result  
Dependent Variable: Students/Teachers 
OLS robust
45 
Variable Coefficient  t-value 
Participation -0.08 -0.62 
Fragmentation 0.89 1.52 
Recognition -0.06 -0.06 
Political Alignment  1.46 0.95 
GDP per capita  -0.001 -4.47 
Public Expenditure p/c  -322.5 -0.32 
Constant 20.3 8.15 
R2 0.42  
Observations 24  
 
All the coefficients have the expected sign, but none of the union variables is significant at a 90 
percent level of confidence. (Only union fragmentation is significant at an 85 percent level of 
confidence: those provinces where there is only one single union have a lower number of 
students per teacher). Most of the variation across provinces is explained by GDP per capita: 
richer provinces have more teachers per student. 
                                                           
45 Variables description and basic statistics are in Appendix 2. 
  34In brief, there is only weak evidence to support the proposition that those provinces 
where teacher unions are “stronger” also tend to have a lower number of students per teacher. As 
a previous section explored the relation between class size and student performance and did not 
find any clear pattern, no effect of unions on performance through this channel can be claimed. 
 
5.4 Budget, Composition and Wages 
 
It is expected that stronger unions in terms of density, legal recognition and union monopoly 
have the ability to obtain higher education budgets and a higher allocation of the budget to 
salaries. Provincial educational budgets also depend on local revenues, but as Sanguinetti, 
Sanguinetti and Nicolini (2000) argue, national transfers to the provinces are also important, 
since the federal coparticipation regime is highly redistributive. 
In order to explore these issues three regressions are run. In the first, the dependent 
variable is the log of public expenditure on education per student. The second looks at the share 
of public education spent on wages. Finally, the third regression explores the variation in 
teachers’ wages (relative to the average provincial income) across provinces. The first and third 
regressions use means from panel data for the period 1997-1999. The second regression is based 
on information for a single year (1997). 
 
Table 14. Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: Educational Expenditure and Wages 
 OLS Robust 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
Variable  Public expenditure on  
Education per student  
Share of public education 
spent on wages 
Teachers’ Wages 
(relative to average 
income) 
Participation -0.001 0.003 -0.484
 (-0.18) (1.07) (-0.46)
Fragmentation 0.038 0.014 2.296
 (0.71) (0.85) (0.25)
Recognition -0.185 0.058 21.74
 (-1.68) (1.89) (1.22)
Political Alignment  -0.071 0.011 -2.448
 (-0.45) (0.28) (-0.84)
Local Revenues  0.417 -0.052 3.600
 (8.38) (-4.33) (0.56)
National Transfers  0.193 0.070 43.13
 (1.92) (2.84) (3.06)
Constant 3.603 0.618 -194.8
 (4.28) (2.82) (-1.49)
R2 0.85 0.61 0.45
Observations 24 24 24
  35The findings show that public education expenditure per student is higher in those 
provinces where local revenues and national transfers are higher. None of the teachers’ unions 
variables is statistically significant, and they have the opposite sign of those expected. However, 
as expected, those provinces where teacher unions have higher density and legal recognition 
have a higher share of education budget allocated to wages. (Only “Recognition” is significant at 
a 90 percent level). Regarding the fiscal variables, national transfers have a positive and 
significant coefficient, but local revenues have a negative effect. 
Finally, there is no statistically significant relation between teachers’ unions and teacher 
wages (relative to the average provincial income). The only significant factor is national 
transfers, which have a positive effect. This leads to the following interpretation.  Provinces that 
are more fiscally responsible (collect more taxes) tend to have higher expenditures per student. 
and a smaller share of that money goes to salaries. Provinces that are more generously treated by 
the Federal Government have bigger expenditure per student, but more of this money goes to 
salaries as they have higher teachers’ wages. Provincial teacher unions are basically irrelevant, 
except that they increase the share of salaries in the education budget.
46 
 
5.5. Job Satisfaction 
 
In the education production function estimation it is found that the more satisfied the teacher is 
the better students perform. There is also the presumption that teachers’ job satisfaction and 
union membership are related, so it could be argued that unions affect students performance 
through their impact on teachers’ job satisfaction. However, from a theoretical perspective the 
relation between unions and satisfaction is unclear.  Since the objective of this study is to provide 
new evidence on the relation between unions and student performance, empirical analysis rather 
than theoretical discussion will be emphasized. 
The Encuesta de Desarrollo Social (EDS) provides a useful micro data set to explore 
these issues. It contains information for 1,534 teachers spread across all the provinces. The data 
include whether a teacher participates in a labor union, whether the teacher is satisfied with 
his/her job, and other important characteristics such as gender, age, income, and education. 
                                                           
46 This does not mean that teacher unions have no impact. Actually, teachers unions impose strong pressure for 
higher wages and budgets, but they have do so in a centralized fashion. The most salient recent episode was the so-
called “carpa blanca,” a demonstration organized by CTERA, where teachers engaged in a hunger strike in front of 
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Table 15. Job Satisfaction and Union Participation 
  Are you satisfied with your job? 
  YES (JS=1)  NO (JS=0) 
Union Member  7.6 %  12.7 % 
Not Member  93.4 %  87.3 % 
                       Source: EDS. 
 
As shown in Table 15, job satisfaction and union participation appear to be negatively correlated. 
While 12.7 percent of the “dissatisfied” teachers participate in a labor union, only 7.6 percent of 
the satisfied teachers are union members. 
Regrettably, there is not enough information availability to determine the temporal 
relation between job satisfaction and participation. In other words, it could not be discerned 
whether job dissatisfaction was a consequence of union participation or whether dissatisfaction 
preceded the decision to participate in a union. Consequently, the data are not well suited to 
analyze what this negative correlation means. As mentioned in Section 4.3, there are at least 
three possible explanations for this pattern: The first is the “voice” argument provided by 
Freeman and Medoff (1986). The second reason is that unions worsen teachers’ working 
conditions. The third possibility is that a negative relation between job satisfaction and union 
participation might be capturing unobserved personal characteristics of the teacher. For instance, 
teachers who are more prone to conflict and dissatisfaction may also be more likely to join an 
organization such as a labor union. 
From the evidence available, it seems that that the second hypothesis should be discarded 
(as shown, unions seem to increase teachers’ wages and employment).
47 The validity of the third 
hypothesis is explored by analyzing the relation between union participation and satisfaction, 
controlling for participation in other organizations such as ecological or human rights groups.
48 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the National Congress. This demonstration led to the approval of a special national tax on automobiles to finance 
wage increases for all teachers throughout the country (the so-called incentivo docente, i.e., “teaching incentive”). 
47 Although that might possibly come at the expense of dissatisfaction along other dimensions; alternatively, unions 
might raise expectations and demand levels, widening the gap between expectations and actual work conditions. 
48  Perhaps a better control would be how happy the person is overall, or outside of work. Regrettably, this 
information is not available. People who join organizations such as ecological or human rights groups, however, 
may also be more prone to express discontent, and this could provide a good control to explore the validity of the 
third hypothesis. 
  37Table 16. Job Satisfaction and Participation in Ecological or Human Rights Groups 
  Are you satisfied with your job? 
  YES (JS=1)  NO (JS=0) 
Participates  2.1 %  1.4 % 
Does NOT participate  97.9 %  98.6 % 
Source: EDS 
 
A very low rate of participation in these organizations is found, with a slightly higher rate 
among satisfied teachers. Thus, the third hypothesis might not be an appropriate explanation for 
the negative relation found between satisfaction and union participation. 
Since it is not possible to solve the endogeneity problem between “participation” and JS, 
the partial correlation between teacher’s job satisfaction (JS) and union participation is 
examined, “controlling” for age, gender, the teacher’s education, income and participation in 
ecological or human rights groups. 
 
Table 17. Partial Correlation Coefficients of Job Satisfaction 
  Column 1  Column 2 
Variables Correlation Significance Correlation  Significance
Union Participation  -0.05 0.04 -0.05  0.03
Participation in ecological 
or human rights groups 
0.02 0.54
Age 0.07 0.01 0.07  0.01
Gender (female=0)  -0.02 0.54 -0.02  0.53
Teacher’s Education  0.01 0.95 0.01  0.97
Teacher’s Income  0.07 0.00 0.07  0.00
Nº Observ.  1,517 1517 
 
There is a negative and significant relation between job satisfaction and union 
participation. It is also observed that the negative relation found in column 1 does not disappear 
after controlling for participation on ecological or human rights groups (column 2). This result is 
interpreted as evidence against the third hypothesis. Therefore, as a very first approximation it is 
concluded that the “voice” hypothesis presented by Freeman is possibly the best argument to 
explain the negative relation found between job satisfaction and union membership. 
 
  386. Conclusion 
 
This paper constitutes a first look at the effects of trade unions on the education sector in 
Argentina, providing new information and preliminary results on some of the channels of union 
influence on the performance of this crucial sector.
49 The next few paragraphs highlight some of 
these main channels.  
First, union characteristics have an important effect on days of class lost to strikes.  Days 
lost are also related to fiscal problems and delayed payment of wages by provincial authorities. 
Furthermore, the nature of the political relationship between unions and provincial authorities is 
a factor influencing strike activity. As days of class one of the stronger explanatory variables for 
student learning, there is a reason to criticize unions in this regard. However, union leaders argue 
that strikes are an instrument for improving teachers’ working conditions, increasing education 
budgets and consequently improving education outcomes. While the present results do not 
confirm or refute this claim, they show that the means unions use to obtain their demands have 
strong and negative effects on student learning. 
It is also found that unions report an important concern on tenuring teachers, as student 
learning improves when the teacher in front of the class is a tenured one. But since tenuring also 
seems to increase absenteeism, it might reduce the actual number of tenured teachers in front of 
the class, with an uncertain net effect on student learning. Regarding public expenditure on 
education and teachers’ salaries, there is not a strong union effect, except that they increase the 
share of salaries in the education budget. Budgets and salaries are mainly determined by fiscal 
variables. Finally, there is evidence that union strength is positively correlated with lower 
student/teacher ratios, and that union participation and job satisfaction are negatively correlated. 
In summary, the impact of unions on students’ performance depends on the channel and 
kind of political market where unions operate, but not on the existence of unions by itself. There 
are, however, some limitations to this analysis. Only the effect of cross-provincial union 
characteristics on education outcomes has been considered, and this may understate the total 
effects of teachers’ unions, since much of their activity operates at the national level, by 
influencing national legislation, overall budgets, etc. Also, there is an “intercept” of union 
influence in the weakest-union province, which is not estimated; only the marginal effect of 
                                                           
49 It is worth noting at this point that there appear to be broader “political” factors not considered in this analysis 
which might have a bigger impact than union activity on the quality of education in Argentina. 
  39additional union strength in cross-provincial comparisons is considered.  This “lower bound” in 
turn is also related to national level factors. For example, legislation such as the Estatutos 
Docentes (which is uniformly supported by teacher unions throughout the country) has its 
historical origin in national legislation and is believed to have strong negative incentive effects. 
The exploration of these issues is left for future work. 
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The SINEC survey provides information for 23952 students, 1761 teachers and 991 principals. 
The next table provides a description of the variables we use and their basic statistics: 
Table 18. EPF Basic Statistics 
Variable Name  Description  Values   1997 mean  1999 mean 
Gender  Student’s sex  1 female 
0 male  0.50 0.51 
Kindergarten  If the student has attended  
kindergarten 
0 no 
1 yes  0.87 0.86 
Family Size  Density of people living at 
home  0 to 11  1.50  1.59 
Father  Education  Father’s education 
1 Incomplete Elementary school 
2 Completed Elementary school 
3 Incomplete High School 
4 Completed High school 
5 Incomplete University formation 
6 Completed University formation 
3.09 3.01 
Mother Education  Mother’s education 
1 Incomplete Elementary school 
2 Completed Elementary school 
3 Incomplete High School 
4 Completed High school 
5 Incomplete University formation 
6 Completed University formation 
3.17 3.11 
Repeated grade  Has the student repeated a 
course? 
1 yes 
0 no  0.29 0.25 
Family Wealth  Wealth measured in pesos  0 to 17000  8276.47  8910.97 
Class Size  Number of classmates    25.18  25.82 
Teacher Experience  Teacher’s experience 
1 if TE is less than 1 year 
2 if TE is between 1 and 5 years 
3 if TE is between 6 and 10 years 
4 if TE is between 11 and 15 years 
5 if TE is between 16 and 20 years 
6 if TE is between 21 and 25 years 
7 if TE is between 26 to 30 years 
8 if TE is more than 30 years 
3.62 3.71 
Dedication  Teacher’s dedication at 
school 
1 full- time 
0 part-time  0.72 0.64 
Teacher Education  Teacher’s education 
1 Maestro normal 
2 prof. enseñanza primaria no univers. 
3 prof. enseñanza primaria universti. 
4 profesor no universitario 
5 profesor universitario 
6 profesional universitario 
1.98 2.22 
Teacher Tenure  If the teacher is tenured  1 yes 
0 no  0.61 0.53 
 
  46Table 18., continued  
      
Variable Name  Description  Values   1997 mean  1999 mean 
Class Days  How many schools days 
she had during the year? 
115 if its less than 121 days 
125 if it’s between 121 and 130 days 
135 if it’s between 131 and 140 days 
143 if it’s between 141 and 145 days 
148 if it’s between 146 and 150 days 
153 if it’s between 151 and 155 days 
158 if it’s between 156 and 160 days 
163 if its more than 161 days 
156.83 120.48 
Job Satisfaction  Teacher’s Job Satisfaction 
index 
1 Very Low 
2 Low 
3 High 
4 Very High 
3.20 2.70 
Principal tenure  If principal is tenured  1 yes  
o no  0.38 0.33 
Principal Experience  Principal’s experience as 
principal 
1 if PE is between 1 and 5 years 
2 if PE is between 6 and 10 years 
3 if PE is between 11 and 15 years 
5 if PE is between 16 and 20 years 
6 if PE is more than 20 year 
1.80 1.88 
 
When the dependent variable for each case is characterized, language test scores are on average 
higher than math scores, presenting different means for each year.  
 
Math Language   
Year 
Mean median  mean  Median 
1997 50.31  47.37  56.03  55.81 
1999 49.76  50.00  54.80  53.00 
 
Ciudad de Buenos Aires has the best test results on average for all the tests and years that were 
analyzed. The other top five provinces are Santa Fe (every test), Mendoza, Buenos Aires and La 
Pampa (3 out of 4 tests). In the bottom five are Tucuman and Chubut (3 out of 4 tests). 
In contrast to the Coleman Report, the present findings include strong evidence that 
several school and classroom factors affect students’ performance. The next table summarizes 
the findings obtained using the EPF for the 1997 and 1999 math and language evaluations. 
 
  47Table 19. Regression Result for 1997 Language Test and 1999 Math and Language test 
OLS clustered by school 
(t values in parenthesis) 
 Dependent  Variable: log(language’97) log(math’99) log(language’99)
 Gender  (female=1)  0.086 0.005  0.129
   (10.431) (0.397)  (10.547)
 Father’s  Education  0.001 -0.003  -0.001
(0.215) (0.637) (0.355)
Student  Mother’s  Education  0.010 0.011  0.002
 (3.391) (2.376)  (1.505) and 
Family  Kindergarten 0.048 0.034  0.030
(3.752) (1.610) (1.638)
Factors  Family size  -0.015 -0.022  -0.023
   (3.914) (3.802)  (3.977)
 Repeated  grade  -0.150 -0.128  -0.145
 (14.323) (7.101)  (9.253)
 Wealth    0.00001 0.00002  0.00001
 (1.709) (2.172)  (1.707)
Students/ teacher  0.002 -0.003  -0.002 Classroom 
(1.750) (1.874) (1.921)
Classroom Structure  0.011 0.013  0.012 Factors 
(3.063) (1.975) (1.527)
  Job Satisfaction  0.021 0.031  0.027
  (1.787) (1.930) (1.847)
  Teacher Tenure  0.002 0.037  0.041
   (0.106) (1.261)  (1.626)
 Teacher’s  Dedication  0.007 0.001  -0.019
   (0.430) (0.058)  (0.863)
 Teacher  Experience  0.009 0.028  0.010
   (1.430) (3.133)  (1.177)
 Teacher  Education  0.014 -0.016  -0.017
 (1.563) (1.476)  (1.468)
  Class Days  0.002 0.003  0.0001
(2.876) (1.974) (1.205)
School  Principal Tenure  0.037 -0.048  -0.007
(1.895) (1.673) (0.308)
Factors  Principal’s experience  -0.005 -0.008  -0.008
 (0.557) (0.769)  (0.838)
 Observations  11263 9312  8959
  R – squared  0.14 0.11  0.14
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Table 20. Teacher Unionism Across Provinces 
(Means for the period 1997-1999) 
Province Participation  Fragmentation Fragmentation  II  Recognition  Political 
 Alignment
Buenos Aires  2.3  4 9.5 1  0.33
Catamarca 3.8  1 7.9 0  0.33
Chaco 3.3  1 6.5 1  1
Chubut 0,1  1 2.4 1  0.33
Ciudad BsAs  4.5  3 3.8 1  1
Cordoba 4.3  1 1.8 1  0.33
Corrientes 3.5  3 4.4 1  0.66
Entre Rios  4.1  1 0.6 1  0.33
Formosa 11.8  2 34.9 0  0.33
Jujuy 1.9  1 2.9 1  0
La Pampa  6.3  1 3.6 0  0.33
La Rioja  0.6  1 2.7 0  0
Mendoza 3.9  1 0.8 1  0.33
Misiones 10.1  1 1.6 1  0.33
Neuquen 13.5  1 1.3 1  0
Rio Negro  12.3  1 1.2 1  0.33
Salta 0.4  2 2.0 1  0.66
San Juan  1.9  1 1.8 1  0
San Luis  7.5  1 6.6 0  0.66
Santa Cruz  7.0  1 2.8 1  0
Santa Fe  0.8  1 0.3 1  0.33
Santiago Estero  2.0  2 8.6 1  1
Tierra Fuego  0.1  1 12.7 0  0
Tucuman 4.7  1 1.1 1  0
 Source: CEDI. 
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1. Strikes 
Description 
Variable Description  Source 
STRIKES  Number of class days lost due to teachers’ unions 
strikes. 
Authors’ calculations 
based on Ministry of 
Labor, CTI, and 
newspapers 
Delay Number  of  provincial  civil service strikes. We 
consider is a good proxy for payment delays in the 
public sector.  
Ministry of Labor and 
CTI 
Attendance bonus  Attendance bonus as a percentage of wages.  Ministry of Education 
Note: The province is the unit of analysis. 
Basic Statistics 
Variable  Nº Obs  Mean  Std. Dev  Min  Max 
STRIKES 72  6.13 10.88 0  76
Participation 72  4.60 3.90 0.1  13.5
Fragmentation 72  1.42 0.82 1  4
Recognition 72  0.75 0.44 0  1
Political Alignment  72  0.36 0.33 0  1
Delay 72  3.36 10.85 0  81





Table 21. Tenured Teachers across Provinces (1994) 
Province  Percentage of Tenured 
Teachers 
Province  Percentage of Tenured 
Teachers 
BUENOS AIRES  59%  MENDOZA  67% 
CATAMARCA 32%  MISIONES  58% 
CHACO 49%  NEUQUEN  46% 
CHUBUT 56%  RIO  NEGRO  43% 
CORDOBA 65%  SALTA  67% 
CORRIENTES 64%  SAN  JUAN  63% 
Ciudad BS.AS.  57%  SAN LUIS  65% 
ENTRE RIOS  56%  SANTA CRUZ  47% 
FORMOSA 41%  SANTA  FE  59% 
JUJUY 65%  SANT.  DEL  ESTERO  43% 
LA PAMPA  48%  TIERRA DEL FUEGO 38% 
LA RIOJA  50%  TUCUMAN  61% 
Source: Censo Nacional Docente (1994). 
 
 
  503. Class  Size 
Description and basic statistics 
Description Mean  Source 
Number of teachers in primary and public schools  9,999 Ministry Education 
Number of students attending primary and public schools  17,248
9 
Ministry Education 
Student/Teacher Ratio  16.34   
Provincial GDP per capita  6538  Ministry of the 
Economy 
Total public expenditure per capita  0.0014 Ministry of the 
Economy 
 
4. Job  Satisfaction 
 
Variables Description 
Variable Description  Source 
Job satisfaction  1 if the teacher is satisfied with her job, 0 otherwise  EDS 
Participation on 
ecological or human 
rights groups 
1 if the teacher participates in ecological or 
human rights associations 
EDS 
Age In  years  EDS 
Gender  1 if male, 0 if female.  EDS 
Teacher’s education  Number of years of schooling  EDS 
Income   Wage, in pesos  EDS 
Note: Teachers are the unit of analysis. 
 
Basic Statistics 
Variable  If the teacher IS satisfied (JS=1)  If the teacher is NOT 
satisfied (JS=0) 
 Obs.  Mean  Std.Dev.  Obs.  Mean  Std.Dev. 
Union Participation  1,463  0.076 0.265 71 0.127 0.335 
Part. ecological or human 
rights 
1,462 0.021 0.144 71 0.014 0.119 
Age 1,463  36.419 9.853 71 32.155 8.309 
Gender 1,463  0.159 0.365 71 0.183 0.390 
Teacher’s education  1,448  14.432 1.871 70 14.314 2.137 
Income 1,463  501.99 397.18 71 334.80 309.01 
 
 
  51